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Strengthening of the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act in 1984:
The Original Loopholes, the
Amendments, and the Political Factors
Behind Their Passage
Richard Ottinger*
I. Introduction
The successful passage of very strong hazardous waste
amendments to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA)' in 1984 was a remarkable feat.2 The amendments
vastly extended the regulatory authority of the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) over municipal governments, and
private industry in the area of toxic waste, accomplishing an
objective contrary to the entire thrust of the Reagan adminis-
tration's deregulatory ideology.
In the early 1960's, toxic chemicals were already a threat
to the safety of our environment, and the challenge which in-
spired the ensuing environmental movement was set forth in
* Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law; B.A., Cornell University;
LL.B., Harvard Law School. The author served as a member of Congress, represent-
ing Westchester County, New York, from 1965 to 1971 and from 1975 to 1985. He was
Chairman of the Subcommittee on Energy Conservation and Power and a member of
the Subcommittee on Health and Environment of the House Energy and Commerce
Committee. He was also on the two energy subcommittees of the House Committee
on Science and Technology. He was the founder of the Environmental and Energy
Study Conference, the largest bipartisan, bicameral organization in Congress, com-
prised of 278 Representatives and 83 Senators. Mr. Ottinger is the founding chairman
of the Environmental and Energy Study Institute in Washington, D.C. and serves on
the Board of Directors of the League of Conservation Voters and Peace PAC.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991 (1984). RCRA (PL94-580) "was enacted as an amend-
ment to the 1965 Solid Waste Disposal Act." Hazardous-Waste Legislation on the
Move; Awaits Action in the Second House Committee, Cong. Q., June, 5, 1982, at
1348.
2. See infra note 153 and accompanying text.
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Rachel Carson's trailblazing novel, Silent Spring:
If, having endured much, we have at last asserted our
'right to know,' and if, knowing, we have concluded that
we are being asked to take senseless and frightening risks,
then we should no longer accept the counsel of those who
tell us that we must fill our world with poisonous chemi-
cals; we should look about and see what other course is
open to us.3
By the early 1980's, however, measures to control the hazards
of toxic chemicals were still grossly inadequate. The environ-
mental challenge of the forthcoming decades, aside from the
paramount threat of nuclear annihilation, is likely to be the
control of hazardous substances that are ever more ubiquitous
in our environment.
The severity of our toxic waste problem was recently
dramatized by the release of methyl isocyanate (MIC)' from
underground storage tanks belonging to a Union Carbide
plant in Bhopal, India. Approximately 2,500 people were
killed and as many as 100,000 may have been permanently
injured.'
Prior to the enactment of the 1984 RCRA amendments,
MIC and the class of chemicals to which it belongs were not
even listed as hazardous wastes in the U.S. by EPA, and the
storage of chemicals in underground tanks was also not sub-
ject to EPA regulation in this country.e In fact, above ground
storage tanks in the U.S. remain outside of RCRA's purview
even after the 1984 amendments.
Internationally, hazards to human safety and health
caused by industrially produced chemicals are increasing in
frequency and severity. Although the Bhopal incident was the
3. Rachel Carson, Silent Spring, 277-78 (1962).
4. "MIC belongs to a family of toxins for which there is no antidote and no treat-
ment. It is used in the manufacture of insecticides that kill by attacking the nervous
system." Clark & Croshell, An Unstoppered Killer, Newsweek, Dec. 17, 1984 at 32.
5. Whitaker, 'It Was Like Breathihg Fire ... ,' Newsweek, Dec. 17, 1984, at 26.
6. Beck, Could it Happen in America?, Newsweek, Dec. 17, 1984, at 38.
7. Davis, Bhopal Tragedy Prompts Scrutiny by Congress, Cong. Q., Dec. 22,
1984, at 3147.
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worst and most dramatic, it was by no means an isolated inci-
dent.8 Even in this country, tales of hazardous waste disaster
have been reported with great frequency.'
The scope of our hazardous waste problem is evidenced
by our ever-growing familiarity with chemicals that are linked
8. During the 1950s "at Minamata Bay in southern Japan, waste mercury from a
chemical plant contaminated fish eventually inflicting disfiguring paralysis or slow
death on thousands" of Japanese. Boraiko, Storing Up Trouble .. .Hazardous
Waste, 167 Nat'l Geog. 346-47 (1985). The Minamata disease struck central Japan
again in 1965 and "harbor dredging at the site of the first disaster threatens to send
mercury up the food chain once again." Id.
9. In October 1984, "a derivative of the insecticide malathion escaped from an
American Cyanamid tank in Linden, N.J., blanketing a 20-mile area with noxious
fumes that drove 100 people to hospitals." Beck, supra note 6, at 44.
A month later, there were two more dangerous chemical releases from Linden,
New Jersey plants, from which prevailing winds pass over New York City. Id.
Due to the discovery of long-buried chemicals in leaking drums at the Love Ca-
nal in Niagara Falls, New York in 1978 and the dioxin contamination at Times
Beach, Missouri in 1983, residents had to be evacuated and their homes purchased by
the federal government. Boraiko, supra note 8, at 323-25.
The Stringfellow acid pits in California (where "34 million gallons of solvents,
acids, toxic metals and DDT" were dumped between 1956 and 1972) still remain and
have started to seep into the "acquifer supplying seven eastern Los Angeles suburbs"
in which a half million people reside. Id. at 336-37.
Causing additional concern are the more than 760,000 individual generators of
hazardous waste at sites which are, as of yet, anonymous. Swanson, Shifting the Bur-
den of Environmental Protection, 18 J. Econ. Issues 251, 253 (1984).
In Westchester County, New York, state action was recently initiated to prohibit
the interstate sale of Hudson River striped bass which spawn in its Westchester
reaches because of the high level of contamination Maniace, What's Causing Tumors
in Hudson River Fish, Reporter Dispatch (Westchester, N.Y.), Feb. 28, 1985, at B6,
col. 2.
As an affirmative measure, the Westchester County Board of Legislators under-
took to consider a proposal to spend 1.2 million dollars per year for a specially
trained and equipped hazardous waste firefighting unit. Greene, Westchester Funds
Sought to Create Fire Unit to Handle Hazardous Materials, Reporter Dispatch
(Westchester, N.Y.), March 14, 1985, at A6, col. 1.
As a step backwards, however, the N.Y. Court of Appeals affirmed an Appellate
Divison decision which held that local zoning laws take precedence over the State
Hazardous Waste law, thereby preventing the placement of dredged polychlorinated
biphenyls (PCBs) from the Hudson River in a safe repository upstate Washington
County Cease, Inc. v. Persico, 99 A.D.2d 321, 473 N.Y.S.2d 610, (1984); afl'd, 64
N.Y.2d 923, 488 N.Y.S.2d 630 (1985). This was a serious set-back of efforts to clean
up the PCBs in the Hudson River, and casts doubt on the State's ability to qualifiy
for Superfund monies ( See infra notes 35, 40-41 and accompanying text) since eligi-
bility requires the pre-selection of clean-up disposal sites. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(3)(B)
(1980).
19851
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to causing cancer and genetic damage. An abridged list would
consist of:
(1) Dioxin;10
(2) PCBs; 11
(3) Pesticides such as aldrin, dieldrin, endrin,
heptachlor, chloradane, toxaphene, and kepone;12
(4) Asbestos;"
(5) Saccharin;"
(6) Hexachlorophene;' 5
(7) TRISa
10. Dioxin (TCDD) is a contaminant of phenoxy herbicides such as 2,4,5-T
(2,4,5-trichlorophenoxyacetic). "It is the most toxic known chemical, inducing cancer
and birth defects in experimental animals in parts-per-trillion concentrations." S. Ep-
stein, L. Brown, & C. Pope, Hazardous Waste in America 26 (1982) [hereinafter cited
as Hazardous Waste]. "Less than 3 ounces of TCDD could kill the entire population
of New York City." Id. at 93.
11. Polychlorinated Biphenyl (PCB) is a synthetic organic chemical. It is pro-
duced "[bly tacking chlorine onto particular hydrocarbons known as phenols." The
chemical's "greatest value was its ability to resist breakdown from heat and electrical
charges when used as insulating fluids in transformers and other electrical machin-
ery." Id. at 23-24. PCBs are toxic organic chemicals and "are thought be be the 'most
widespread chemical contaminant known to man."' Swanson, Shifting the Burden of
Environmental Protection, 18 J. Econ. Issues 253 (citation omitted).
12. Pesticides are chemicals "used to kill pests, esp. insects and rodents." The
American Heritage Dictionary 927 (2d ed. 1982). The noted pesticides are all linked
to chronic health and environmental problems. Swanson, supra note 11, at 253.
13. "Asbestos is the generic name for a group of minerals composed of calcium
and magnesium silicates formed into long, threadlike fibers .... They possess the
special qualities of very high resistance to heat and electricity." Hazardous Waste,
supra note 10, at 19. This substance poses a danger to society. Its " 'fibrous nature"
and "its resistance to biological degradation and chemical change" allows the tiny
asbestos fibers to penetrate exposed surfaces of the lungs after being inhaled. This
causes "a continuous irritation and cellular response which results either in progres-
sive lung disease known as asbestosis or in a variety of cancers of the lung and other
sites when blood and lymph streams carry the fibers through the body." Id. at 19-20.
14. Saccharin is "[a] white crystalline powder ... having taste about 500 times
sweeter than cane sugar, used as a calorie-free sweetener." The American Heritage
Dictionary 1082 (2d ed. 1982). It was on the market for years before it was deter-
mined to be a cause of cancer. Swanson, supra note 11, at 253.
15. Hexachlorophene (HCP) can be found in cosmetic ingredients (Hazardous
Waste, supra note 10, at 92) and is known for its ability to inhibit bacterial growth.
Swanson, supra note 11, at 253. The chemical was used in lotions, aerosol sprays, and
soaps and is considered toxic because it was found to cause damage to the central
nervous system. Id.
16.
Tris (2,3 dibromoprophyl) phospate (TRIS) is a "flame-retardant used in
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol3/iss1/1
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(8) Red Dye No. 2;'7
(9) DES;' 8
(10) TCE;'9
(11) PBBs;20
(12) PCPs;2 1
(13) Benzene;22
children's sleepwear until 1977, when it was banned as a hazardous substance
by the United States Consumer Producty Safety Commission. TRIS, a potent
mutagen and carcinogen, was found on unwashed children's sleepwear at con-
centrations of up to 72,000 parts per million (ppm). Significant quantities of
TRIS could be ingested through children's and infants' frequent mouthing of
the material or through skin absorption. It is estimated that over 60 million
children were exposed to potentially dangerous levels of this toxin.
See Hazardous Waste, supra note 10, at 49-50.
17. Red Dye No. 2 was "banned as a carcinogen [a cancer-causing agent] in 1976
after Americans had been ingesting it at the rate of about 500 tons per year." Swan-
son, supra note 11, at 253 (citation omitted).
18. Diethylstilbestrol (DES) is "[a] synthetic estrogen." It was "implicated as the
cause of vaginal cancer in daughters of mothers given the drug in the unfounded
belief that it might prevent complications of late pregnancy." Hazardous Waste,
supra note 10, at 293. It is also a "cancer-causing agent once used as an animal feed
supplement." Swanson, supra note 11, at 253 (citation omitted).
19. Trichloroethylene (TCE) is a toxic chemical which "can induce acute liver
and central nervous system damage; its chronic effects include deafness, visual de-
fects, behavioral disturbances and carcinogenic [cancer-causing] effects, as evidenced
in experimental animals." Hazardous Waste, supra note 10, at 37. TCE was "widely
used as an industrial solvent ...and is now appearing in groundwater across the
country." Swanson, supra note 11, at 253 (citation omitted). See also Hazardous
Waste, supra note 10, at 81-83.
20. Polybrominated biphenyl (PBB) is a synthetic organic chemical, produced by
tacking bromine onto particular hydrocarbons known as phenols. This chemical was
effective used as a fire retardant, its toxicity results in part from the bromine, very
toxic chemical. Hazardous Waste, supra note 10, at 20-26. In 1974, "between five
hundred and one thousand pounds of this highly toxic flame retardant were ac-
cidently mixed with cattle feed and shipped out to Michigan farms. Millions of chick-
ens, over thirty thousand cows, and thousands of sheep either died or had to be de-
stroyed after consuming PBB-laden feed. The human cost is also high: the health of
dozens of farm families was seriously affected, and thousands of Michigan residents
now carry significant amounts of PBB in their bodies." Id. at 49 (contained in non-
numerical footnote).
21. Pentachlorophenol (PCP) is a compound used in a solution "as a wood pre-
servative to resist termites." Id.
22. Benzene is a synthetic organic chemical. Id. at 26. Benzene "is very flamma-
ble at high concentrations; in lower concentrations it is acutely toxic, causing skin
irritation and drowsiness; and even at lower exposure levels it is chronically toxic,
leading to a usually fatal blood disease known as aplastic anemia, as well as to acute
myelogenous leukemia." Id. at 37.
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(14) Vinyl Chloride. 3
To emphasize the dimension of our hazardous waste
problem, more than 60,000 chemical substances are in use to-
day,24 and according to the National Research Council (NRC),
only 20% of them have been tested for their health effects.25
There are an estimated 180,000 shipments by truck or rail of
hazardous substances in the U.S. per day,26 which translates
into seventy-one billion gallons per year or "264 million met-
ric tons of liquid and solid hazardous wastes are produced" in
the U.S. each year.
Moreover, there are an estimated 25,000 sites28 at which
hazardous materials have been dumped and OTA has recently
reported that approximately ten thousand of these sites may
require urgent clean-up at a cost of one hundred billion dol-
lars.2 9 Toxics from hazardous waste repositories are leaching
into groundwater and acquifers30 (from which our drinking
water is derived),31 and an estimated ten to fifteen million
tons of hazardous wastes are mixed with fuel oil and burned
in conventional boilers each year32 causing frightening air pol-
lution risks.
This commentary discusses the nature of the legal loop-
holes that existed in the original RCRA statute, and high-
lights several of the provisions of the 1984 RCRA amend-
23. Vinyl Chloride (VC) is a synthetic organic chemical and "a highly potent
carcinogen." Id. at 26. "By adding halogens, simple precursors of new plastics, such as
vinyl chloride (VC), are synthesized; the VC was subsequently polymerized to form
polyvinyl chloride (PVC) for use in records, plastic pipe, and a wide range of other
plastics." Id. at 24.
24. Beck, supra note 6, at 38.
25. Id.
26. Id. (emphasis added).
27. Shabecoff, Toxic Wastes Go From One Leaky Dump to Another: On the
Move But Not Yet on the Wane, N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1984 at E2, col. 3.
28. Shabecoff, Toxic Waste Threat Termed Far Greater than U.S. Estimates,
N.Y. Times, March 10, 1985, at Al, col. 1.
29. Id.
30. Memorandum from Judy Campbell Bird to Ken Murphy (March 9, 1985)
(concerning Environmental and Energy Study Institute Seminar on Groundwater
Protection: Emerging Issues and Policy Changes, Washington, D.C., March 11-12,
1985).
31. Id.
32. 98 Cong. Rec. S13820 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1984) (statement of Sen. Chafee).
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ments that serve to either rectify or ameliorate the prior
deficiencies. It also examines the political factors that affected
the passage of the 1984 amendments, enabling them to pass
during a period of anti-regulatory emphasis.
II. Background: The Statutory Framework of Toxic Waste
Regulation
The statutory framework for controlling hazardous waste
is incredibly complicated and filled with many loopholes. 3
RCRA, the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA),34 and the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act (CERCLA) of 1980, commonly referred to as the
"Superfund Act,"35 are the principal statutes designed to ad-
dress hazardous waste protection, but a myriad of additional
legislation is applicable to various aspects of the problem. 6
33. See H.R. Rep. No. 198, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 5576, 5577-79.
34. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1982).
35. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982).
36. The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) (7 U.S.C.
§§ 13 6 -136 y (1982)) addresses the registration (Id. at § 136a), labeling (Id. at §§
136a(c)(1)(C), 136a(c)(5)(B)) and use (Id. at § 136a(d)(1)) of pesticides and their resi-
dues, and contains some authority for EPA to regulate removal and disposal of haz-
ardous pesticides from the market place (Id. at 136q).
The Consumer Product Safety Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2083 (1982)) provides for
safety standards for consumer products including the power to ban from the market-
place those that may be toxic.
Ocean dumping of hazardous wastes is dealt with under the Marine Protection,
Research and Sanctuaries Act (MPRSA) of 1972 (16 U.S.C. §§ 1431-1434 (1982)).
The Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. ]§ 1301-392 (1982)) gives
its administrator power to set standards for, and remove from the marketplace, food
products that may be contaminated by hazardous substances.
The Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) (29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982))
provides authority for adoption by the Labor Department of standards for workplace
hazards including the exposure of workers to toxic substances.
The Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) (42 U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j-10 (1982)) reg-
ulates underground injection of wastes and establishes maximum national contamina-
tion levels for public drinking water.
Radioactive wastes are subject to generally exclusive regulation by the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission under the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) (42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296
(1982) and subsequent nuclear legislation.
The Clean Air Act (CAA) (42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982)) and the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), commonly referred to as the Clean Water Act
(CWA) (33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982)) address air and water pollution, respectively,
7
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Many of these statutes overlap giving agencies far too much
opportunity to allege the fault of another authorized agency in
the event of a regulatory failure. Enforcement of the various
statutes under the Reagan administration has been sparse and
the loopholes in each of them are tremendous.
The Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) of 1975 seeks
to assure the safety of chemicals by requiring pre-notification
and testing of them by manufacturers prior to marketing, and
giving EPA the power to exclude chemicals from the market-
place if they are not tested first or if the tests demonstrate a
hazard to human safety or health.3 7 EPA has construed this
requirement to apply only to new chemicals,38 although it has
authority under the statute to require testing of all
chemicals.3 9
CERCLA, the complimentary statute to RCRA,4 was
designed to provide for the clean-up of hazardous substance
spills and contamination at existing disposal sites.41 However,
administration and enforcement of the superfund legislation
have been abysmal. The legislation is so poorly funded that it
can finance only a minute fraction of the necessary clean-
ups. 42 In fact, the superfund received only ten percent of the
funds which OTA estimated would be necessary for effective
implementation and enforcement.4 While a conference com-
mittee of Congress is now addressing these inadequacies, the
funding being considered for this year is still but a fraction of
including hazardous and toxic pollutants.
The Department of Transportation has authority to regulate the transportation
of hazardous waste under the Hazardous Transportation Act (49 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1812
(1982)) and its generic statute (49 U.S.C. §§ 10101-11901 (1982).
37. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2604(f), 2605(a).
38. 40 C.F.R. § 720.1 (1985).
39. See 15 U.S.C. § 2603(a)(1)(A)(i).
40. "Although RCRA established an extensive system for wastes now being pro-
duced, it created only limited means for cleaning up sites where such wastes had been
improperly handled in the past." Comment, Issues of Federalism in Hazardous
Waste Control: Cooperation or Confusion?, 6 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 307, 319 (1982).
Congress delegated this task to CERCLA. Id.
41. Id.
42. Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress, Technologies and Manage-
ment for Hazardous Waste Control 6 (1983) [hereinafter cited as OTA].
43. See id.
[Vol. 3
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the identified need."
RCRA was "first enacted in 1965 as a grant-in-aid pro-
gram to assist the states in their dealing with the problem of
open, burning dumps. '45 In 1976, it was transformed into a
comprehensive regulatory program designed to accomplish the
following three objectives:
provide a system for tracking and preserving a record of
the movement of hazardous waste form its origin to its
ultimate disposal (euphemistically from 'cradle to grave');
ensure that disposal of hazardous waste is accomplished
by means that prevent escape of the wastes into the envi-
ronment; and provide an enforcement mechanism to en-
sure compliance with the first two objectives.4
Prior to the 1984 amendments, however, this "cradle to
grave" approach to regulating toxic wastes contained immense
statutory gaps, and the necessity of amending RCRA was
demonstrated by its unenforceability and ineffective results.
III. RCRA-Before and After the Amendments
In March, 1983, OTA asserted that "about 255 to 275 mil-
lion metric tons ... of hazardous waste are generated" under
federal and state regulation, and an "estimated several hun-
dred million tons per year were going unregulated" due to
Congressional and EPA exemptions.47
A. The Nature of the Loopholes
At least 80% of regulated hazardous waste 48 is land dis-
posed in surface impoundments,49 landfills,50 or by deep-well
44. While in the process of reauthorizing the CERCLA legislation which expired
on September 30, 1985, House and Senate conferees tentatively agreed on an $8.5
billion funding level for the next five years. Conferees Agree on $8.5 Billion for
'Superfund', Cong. Q., May 10, 1986, at 1072.
45. Donald Stever, Law of Chemical & Hazardous Waste § 5.01 (in press, 1986).
46. Id.
47. OTA, supra note 42, at 8.
48. Id. at 5.
49. "Surface impoundments-natural topographic depressions, artificial excava-
1985]
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injection 51 , all of which pose dangers to drinking water
supplies.2
1. Surface Impoundments and Landfills.
An extensive 1983 EPA study found that over 70% of all
surface impoundments receiving hazardous wastes in the
United States are unlined. 3 That is, there is no impervious
material placed beneath the waste to prevent the leaching of
toxic substances into ground water or aquifers. State surface
impoundment surveys found that 79% of 416 documented
sites were leaking and that liner failure accounted for only
7.6% of this leakage.5" Thirty-nine percent (39%) of the 8,000
active impoundments studied were found to have a high po-
tential for groundwater contamination. 5 According to an EPA
draft report released on December 29, 1982, most of the
180,973 surface impoundments were "sited [and] constructed
without apparent regard for the protection of groundwater
quality.' ' 56 "The study stressed that 'without proper design
and siting, impoundments have a high potential for contami-
tions, or dike arrangements-can pose major threats to groundwater. Commonly re-
ferred to as pits, ponds, and lagoons, they are extensively employed for storage, treat-
ment and disposal of industrial, municipal, agricultural, mining, and oil- and gas-
brine liquid wastes." S. Epstein, L. Brown, & C. Pope, Hazardous Waste in America
304 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Hazardous Waste].
50. A landfill is "[a] method of rehabilitating land in which garbage and trash
are buried in low-lying ground to build it up." The American Heritage Dictionary 713
(2d ed. 1982).
51. Deep-well injection is a method of waste disposal which utilizes the "process
of forcing a liquid into a well." H.R. Rep. No. 198, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted
in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 5576, 5587.
52. OTA, supra note 42, at 3.
53. Lecture by Richard C. Fortuna, in Washington D.C. (September, 1983)
(available as a reprint: Richard C. Fortuna, Same Wastes, New Solutions, (from the
Hazardous Waste Treatment Council, 1919 Pennsylvania Ave, N.W., Suite 300,
Washington, D.C., 20006)) at 3 [hereinafter cited as Fortuna]. Originally cited from
U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency (Office of Drinking Water) Surface Impoundment As-
sessment (July 1983) (Draft Report).
54. Id. at 3-4.
55. Id. at 6.
56. Current Developments: Drinking Water, Most Surface Impoundments of
Wastes Threaten Groundwater, EPA Study Says, Env't Rep. (BNA), 1503 (Jan. 7,
1983).
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nating groundwater.' "0 Fewer than 10% were found to ade-
quately contain the materials disposed of,58 and RCRA offered
no restrictive or corrective measures. 9
Although landfills account for only a relatively small per-
centage of the destinations for hazardous wastes, 60 they still
posed substantial health threats prior to the RCRA amend-
ments, and they escaped regulation."' After the Love Canal
tragedy,62 EPA prohibited the disposal of containerized liquid
hazardous wastes,63 but failed to issue any restrictions on the
bulk of liquid waste that was disposed directly into landfills,
accounting for far more waste than containerized liquid dispo-
sal.64 EPA then allowed containerized liquids to be disposed
of in landfills as solids if they were mixed with kitty litter!65
This practice was adopted by several companies because the
cost is only a little more than five dollars per drum.66
The RCRA amendments which passed in 1984 address
the major inadequacies described above. After November 8,
1984, any permit issued for a new or replacement landfill or
57. Id.
58. Swanson, Shifting the Burden of Environmental Protection, 18 J. Econ. Is-
sues 252 (1984) (citation omitted).
59. See 42 U.S.C. § 6924 (1976).
60. Fortuna, supra note 53, at 4.
61. Id. at 8.
62. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
63. It should be noted, however, that on February 18, 1982 then current EPA
Administrator, Anne Burford, ordered the abrupt and immediate suspension of this
prohibition without advance notice or opportunity for any public comment. Liners,
Liquids and Conflict of Interest, Nat'l J., Apr. 16, 1983, at 798. During this period,
"thousands of drums of liquid waste were dumped into at least three landfills oper-
ated by Chemical Waste Management." Id. Fortunately, Congressional and public
pressure prompted reimposition of the ban 18 days later. Id.
64. Fortuna, supra note 53, at 8. "In fact, EPA approved landfills as the most
cost-effective method of hazardous waste disposal" (Mosher, EPA Still Doesn't Know
the Dimensions of Nation's Hazardous Waste Problem, Nat'l J., Apr. 16, 1983 at
796) even when the National Academy of Sciences had criticized the use of landfills
because "much of the waste will 'very likely migrate' into the groundwater" (Id.).
Additionally, then Assistant Administrator Rita M. Lavelle believed that the federal
government had no right to interfere with the marketplace by banning certain haz-
ardous wastes from landfills (Id.). Rita Lavelle was dismissed from office on February
4, 1983 and Anne Burford resigned in March of 1983 (Id.).
65. Fortuna, supra note 53, at 11.
66. Id.
11
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surface impoundment, or for the lateral expansion of an ex-
isting landfill or surface impoundment, minimally requires the
installation of double liners, and a leachate collection system
above and between the liners 7 and ground water monitor-
ing. 8 An exception to these requirements exists if the owner
or operator can demonstrate "that alternative design and op-
erating practices, together with location characteristics, will
prevent the migration of any hazardous constituents into the
ground water or surface water at least as effectively as such
liners and leachate collection systems.''69
By November 1986, EPA is to promulgate standards to
implement the above requirements, 70 but in the interim, they
may be fulfilled by installing a "top liner designed, operated,
and constructed of materials to prevent the migration of any
constituent into such liner during the period such facility re-
mains in operation . . . and a lower liner designed, operated
and constructed to prevent the migration of any constituent
through such liner during such period."'7'
In addition to the minimum technological requirements
described above, as of May 1985, "the placement of bulk or
noncontainerized liquid hazardous waste or free liquids con-
tained in hazardous waste (whether or not absorbents have
been added) in any landfill is prohibited. 7 2 This recharacter-
ization of liquid waste served to eliminate the kitty-litter type
evasions previously discussed.7 3 By February 1986, EPA was
required to promulgate final regulations phasing out the dis-
posal of containerized liquids as well.74
Lastly, land disposal of certain particularly dangerous
"specified wastes ' 75 (except as provided in the section on deep
well injections), is prohibited unless EPA determines that a
67. 42 U.S.C. § 6924(o)(1)(A)(i) (1986).
68. Id. at § 6924(o)(1)(A)(ii).
69. Id. at § 6924(o)(2).
70. Id. at § 6924(o)(5)(A).
71. Id. at § 6924(o)(5)(B).
72. Id. at § 6924(c)(1).
73. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
74. 42 U.S.C. § 6924(c)(2). Until then, the prior regulations, effective April 30,
1983, remain in full force and effect. Id.
75. Id. at § 6924(d)(2).
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prohibition of one or more land disposal techniques is not re-
quired to protect human health and the environment. 6
Thus, the RCRA amendments provide a far more sub-
stantial regulatory scheme for surface impoundments and
landfills than previously existed. The problems are so perva-
sive, however, and the costs so great, that enforcement of the
provisions may prove to be an obstacle to effective regulation
in the days to come, due to EPA's lack of resources.77
2. Deep-Well Injections.
A recent EPA study revealed that more hazardous waste
is disposed of in deep injection wells than in all other forms of
land disposal combined. The survey asserted that deep-well
injection accounted for over 10.3 billion gallons of hazardous
wastes in 1982. 7' There was no corrective action requirement
under RCRA in the event that groundwater was contaminated
by the operation of an injection well facility.80 A vast majority
of the deep-well injected waste was found to be corrosive and
organic for which alternate forms of treatment exist."1
The 1984 amendments require EPA to conduct (by Au-
gust of 1987) a complete review of the disposal of specified
hazardous wastes into deep injection wells.2 If it is reasonably
"determined that such disposal may not be protective of
human health and environment for as long as the waste re-
mains hazardous,"83 then EPA "shall promulgate final regula-
tions prohibiting the disposal of such wastes. '84 Also, if EPA
fails to make this determination by August 1987, then "such
hazardous waste shall be prohibited from disposal into any
76. Id. at § 6924(d)(1).
77. See H.R. Rep. No. 198, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 5576, 5579.
78. Fortuna, supra note 53, at 8.
79. Id. at 4. Originally cited in U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency (Office of Solid
Waste), RIA Mail Survey Questionnaire on UIC Wells (Jan. 1982) (unpublished re-
sults of Initial Survey of Underground Injection Wells (Aug. 1983)).
80. See 42 U.S.C. § 6924 (1976).
81. Fortuna, supra note 53, at 8.
82. 42 U.S.C. § 6924(f)(1) (1985).
83. Id. at § 6924(f)(2).
84. Id.
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deep injection well." 85
The amendments, at a minimum, require a review by
EPA of most hazardous wastes disposed of into deep injection
wells and may lead to a prohibition on their future use.
3. Hazardous Waste Generators.
Another major inadequacy of the RCRA statute was that
92% of the hazardous waste generators in this country were
exempt from regulation because they were characterized as
"small generators." ' Such generators could dispose of up to
1000 kilograms of hazardous waste per month without regula-
tion,87 meaning that they could dispose of their waste at any
location and without obligation to maintain records of con-
tents or destination.
The amendments, however, now regulate generators of
between 100 and 1000 kilograms per month (kg/mo) of haz-
ardous waste,88 bringing as much as fifteen million metric tons
of hazardous wastes and over 130,000 additional generators
under RCRA's purview. 9 By March 31, 1986, EPA was re-
85. Id. at § 6924(f)(3).
86. Fortuna, supra note 53, at 7.
87. 40 C.F.R. § 261.5 (1984).
88. 42 U.S.C. § 6921(d)(1). Representative James J. Florio, a New Jersey Demo-
crat and Chairman of the House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Commerce
Transportation and Tourism, introduced this bill in March 1983 (EPA Clash Could
Bring Major Changes in Law, Cong. Q., March 18, 1983, at 583). Florio was greatly
aided by the fact that Norman Lent, the ranking Republican on his subcommittee
and now only member on the full committee was from Long Island where the water
supply was gravely threatened by contamination of its groundwater and acquifer.
Thus, Lent was also in favor of strong regulation despite the anti-regulatory philoso-
phy of the Reagan administration (Author's personal knowledge).
Although the bill found support in the subcommittee (Hazardous-Waste .Legisla-
tion on the Move; Awaits Action in Second Committee, Cong. Q., June 5, 1982, at
1348), Chairman Florio nearly destroyed his chances for a successful vote on the bill
by overreaching for a total elimination of any exemption from regulation-or at least
a requirement that all shipments of 100 kg/mo or less of hazardous waste comply with
the notification and manifest requirements of the legislation (Interview with staff of
the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Commerce, Transportation, and
Tourism, in Washington, D.C. (Feb. 15, 1985). After much wrangling, the bill in its
original form was passed in the House on November 3, 1983. Davis, House Votes to
Tighten Hazardous Waste Law, Cong. Q., Nov. 5, 1983, at 2334.
89. Rosbe & Gulley, The Hazardous & Solid Waste Amendments of 1984: A
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quired to have promulgated standards "sufficient to protect
human health and the environment" for these small quantity
generators."0
In addition to regulating the legitimate use, reuse, re-
cycling, and reclamation of such hazardous waste, the amend-
ments require completion (by the small quantity generator) of
a Uniform Hazardous Waste Manifest91 for shipments off the
premises of between 100 and 1000 kg/mo of hazardous
waste.9 2 This provision became effective on August 5, 1985.11
A possible weakness remains in that the amendments allow
for the storage of between 100 and 1000 kg/mo of hazardous
waste for a period of 180 days without a permit, and the stor-
age of up to 6,000 kg for up to 270 days if it must be shipped
over 200 miles.9 4
Lastly, if it is necessary to protect human health and the
environment, EPA now has the authority to promulgate stan-
dards for the regulation of generators of less than 100 kg/
mo.
95
This series of amendments closed an immense gap in the
original RCRA statute.
4. Listing of Hazardous Wastes.
A majority of hazardous wastes had not been listed by
RCRA for regulation, constituting yet another major defi-
ciency prior to the 1984 amendments. Over 50% of the carcin-
ogens 96 identified by EPA's Carcinogen Assessment Group
Dramatic Overhaul of the Way America Manages its Hazardous Wastes, 14 Envtl.
L. Rep. 10,458, 10,459 (Dec. 1984).
90. 42 U.S.C. § 6921(d)(2). To date these standards have not been promulgated
by the EPA.
91. According to RCRA, "[t]he term 'manifest' means the form used for identify-
ing the quantity, composition, and the origin, routing, and destination of hazardous
waste during its transportation from the point of generation to the point of disposal,
treatment, or storage." Id. at § 6903(12) (1976).
92. Id. at § 6921(3) (1985).
93. Id.
94. Id. at § 6921(d)(6).
95. Id. at § 6921(d)(4).
96. Carcinogens "are materials that cause cancer." Hazardous Waste, supra note
49, at 36.
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were not listed, and no new wastes have been listed since May
of 1980.a9 In fact, over 250 delistings were granted.98
An example of a prior unlisted waste which is a serious
health hazard is dioxin. Dioxins were not listed as hazardous
wastes during the period of the Times Beach, Missouri trag-
edy99 -and even if they were, would have been exempt from
regulation under a gaping loophole for all "recycled" toxins.100
For example, when dioxin was mixed with oil and sprayed on
public roads to prevent the accumulation of dust as in Times
Beach, it was considered an exempt recycled toxin."0' Another
abuse of the recycling exemption permitted between 10 to 15
million tons of hazardous wastes per year to be mixed with oil
and burned in ordinary domestic and industrial boilers at
temperatures that did not ameliorate their toxicity-without
controls on their destruction efficiency or toxic emissions. 02
The RCRA amendments require the listing of a much
more complete range of toxic substances. EPA must add to its
already existing list'0 3 "those hazardous wastes which shall be
subject to the provisons of this subchapter solely because of
the presence in such wastes of certain constituents (such as
97. Fortuna, supra note 53, at 7.
98. Id.
99. See supra note 9 and accompanying text; see also Swanson, supra note 53, at
261.
100. 40 C.F.R. § 261.6 (1982).
101. See Swanson, supra note 58, at 261; see generally Hazardous Waste, supra
note 49, at 133-51; see also Boraiko, Storing Up Trouble
102.
EPA exempt[ed] facilities that burn hazardous wastes for the primary pur-
pose of energy recovery. EPA has estimated that 10-15 million metric tons of
hazardous wastes are burned each year in boilers; over one-half of all hazard-
ous wastes generated are burned in facilities [then], not. . . regulated under
RCRA. EPA has acknowledged that the burning of hazardous waste for en-
ergy recovery . . . 'could pose a parallel or greater risk of environmental dis-
persal of hazardous waste constituents and products of incomplete
combustion.'
Fuel blending is one of several areas where EPA's failure to promulgate
regulations . . . led to direct threats to human health and environment. ...
The potential impact of this loophole is even more significant as more
and more wastes [were] burned in boilers, cement kilns, or other heat recov-
ery units to avoid RCRA regulation and treatment costs." 98 Cong. Rec.
S13820 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1984) (statement of Sen. Chafee).
103. 40 C.F.R. § 261.30-.33 (1985).
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identified carcinogens,"0 4 mutagens,' °5 or teratogens'0 6) at
levels in excess of levels which endanger human health. ' 10 7 All
listed wastes are subject to EPA regulation.'08
In addition to the requirement of a more extensive listing,
the exemption for "recycled toxins" was deleted,109 bringing
yet another previously unregulated area of hazardous waste
disposal under EPA's jurisdiction.
B. New Regulatory Programs
Besides strengthening existing statutory provisions, the
RCRA amendments established two major regulatory
programs.
The first of these programs governs leaking underground
storage tanks.110 "Over 100,000 underground tanks containing
stored toxic wastes are thought to be leaking" around the
country, including mostly gas station storage tanks. ' "An ad-
104. See supra note 96.
105. A mutagen is "[a]n agent, such as radioactive elements or ultraviolet light,
that causes biological mutation." The American Heritage Dictionary 824-25 (2d ed.
1982).
106. A teratogen is an agent "causing fetal malformations or monstrosities." Id.
at 1254.
107. 42 U.S.C. § 6921(b)(1).
108. Id.
109. 42 C.F.R. § 261.6 (1985).
110. EPA calls this the "LUST" program, an acronym for Leaking, Underground
Storage Tanks. Dropkin, An Ounce of Prevention: Leak Detection and the Driller,
Ground Water Age, June 1984, at 40. A principal sponsor of this amendment was
Senator Dave Durenberger, a Republican from Minnesota, who had maintained that
the provision could "be used to prevent Bhopal-type incidents in this country" (Bho-
pal Tragedy Prompts Scrutiny by Congress, Cong. Q., Dec. 22, 1984, at 3147). Intro-
duction of the bill so enraged conservative Republican Senator Steve Symms of Idaho
that he threatened a fillibuster against the bill until the tank provisions were weak-
ened. 98 Cong. Rec. S13812 (daily ed. October 5, 1984) (statement of Sen. Symms).
Senator Symms eventually accepted a compromise, but engaged in a severe attack on
Congressional intrusion into agency regulatory affairs represented by the "hammer"
provisions of the legislation (ld.). Senator Alan Simpson of Wyoming was another
main antagonist to the Durenberger amendment (Id.) and sought and obtained relief
via the bill for radioactive uranium mill tailing provisions in other legislation (Inter-
view with Steven J. Shimberg, Counsel and Director, U.S. Senate Subcommittee on
Envt'l. Pollution, in Washington, D.C. (Feb. 15, 1985)).
111. Rosbe & Gulley, supra note 89, at 10464 citing 130 Cong. Rec. S9164 (daily
ed. July 24, 1984).
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ditional 350,000 underground storage tanks are expected to be
leaking within the next five years." 1 2
By April 1985, the governor of each state was required to
designate an agency to receive notification from all tank own-
ers in the state. 13 By May 1986, each owner of an under-
ground tank must notify the designated agency "of the exis-
tence of such tank, specifying the age, size, type, location, and
uses of such tank."' 1 4 Before February 8, 1987, EPA must pro-
mulgate regulations that, as a minimum, require:
(1) a leak detection system, an inventory control sys-
tem, together with tank testing or a comparable method
for identifying releases;
(2) recordkeeping for monitoring and leak detection;
(3) reporting of releases and corrective actions;
(4) corrective actions in response to releases; and
(5) closure of the tanks when necessary to prevent fu-
ture releases of regulated substances." 5
Additionally, EPA must issue regulations, as it deems
necessary, requiring financial responsibility for taking correc-
tive action and compensating third parties for bodily injury
and property damage caused by accidental releases. " 6
Lastly, by May 8, 1987, EPA must promulgate regulations
concerning the performance standards of new tanks." 7 Such
regulations are to include but need not be limited to tank de-
sign, construction, installation, release detection, and com-
patability standards.1 8 In the interim, no underground stor-
age tanks intended for the storing of regulated substances
may be installed unless such tank will prevent releases due to
corrosion or structural failure, or unless the "soil resistivity in
an installation location is 12,000 ohm/cm or more."" 9
112. Id.
113. 42 U.S.C. § 6991a(b)(1).
114. Id. at § 6991a(a)(1).
115. Rosbe & Gulley, supra note 89, at 10464.
116. 42 U.S.C. § 6991b(d)(1).
117. Id. at § 6991b(e).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 6991b(g)(1), (2).
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Thus, the RCRA amendments provide for the regulation
of an estimated 2.8 to 5 million"' underground storage tanks
that were not covered prior to 1984. However, toxic material
stored in above-ground tanks remain unregulated by RCRA
and thus a large loophole still exists in the area of tank
regulation.
The second new regulatory program concerns the burning
and blending of hazardous wastes, a complement to the elimi-
nation of the "recycled toxins" exemption discussed above.
Prior to the 1984 amendments, most hazardous wastes that
were "beneficially used or reused"1'' (including wastes burned
as fuel or energy recovery) were exempt from EPA regula-
tion. "'22 Due to the fact that there are "an estimated ten to
fifteen million metric tons of hazardous wastes" and used oil
burned each year as fuel in boilers,'2 3 EPA must now issue
standards (by November 8, 1986), applicable to owners, opera-
tors, distributors, or marketers of fuels containing hazardous
wastes, in order to protect human health and the
environment.124
Exemptions exist for "facilities which burn de minimis
quantities of hazardous waste as fuel' 25 if the burned waste is
used to recover useful energy and the waste is burned in a
device designed and operated to have sufficient destruction
and removal efficiency so as to protect human health and the
environment. 26
Despite the exemptions, however, the escape device which
previously allowed for hazardous substances to go unregulated
if they were mixed with oil and used for fuel or energy recov-
ery, no longer exists-thereby closing one of the more serious
loopholes in the original RCRA statute.
120. Rosbe & Gulley, supra note 89, at 10464 citing 130 Cong. Rec. S9164 (daily
ed. July 25, 1984).
121. 40 C.F.R. § 261.6 (1983).
122. Id.
123. 98 Cong. Rec. S13820 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1984) (statement of Sen. Chafee).
124. 42 U.S.C. § 6924(q)(1).
125. Id. at § 6924(q)(2)(B).
126. Id.
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C. Emphasis on Treatment Technologies
Industry's justification for its failure to recycle, chemi-
cally treat, or use high temperature incineration to eliminate
its hazardous waste and to comply with RCRA has always
been the increased economic cost of compliance.1 27 Only 292
gallons of hazardous waste a year were being treated with ap-
proved incineration in 1982.128 According to the director of en-
vironmental affairs at one of the largest disposal companies in
the country, incineration costs between fifteen and twenty
cents per pound of waste and chemical treatment costs up to
sixty cents per pound, while land disposal cost only one to
three cents per pound. 12
9
Nonetheless, while the costs of compliance may indeed be
great, statistics overwhelmingly demonstrate the far greater
costs of non-compliance where a company has to clean up
toxic wastes after improper disposal. 30 EPA has estimated
that industry compliance with RCRA will cost about $90 per
ton, whereas improper disposal and cleanup would cost over
$2,000 per ton. 3 ' That startling contrast was borne out dra-
matically at Love Canal where proper treatment of the wastes
"would have cost $2 million (in 1979 dollars) versus $36 mil-
lion for remedial action . . . spent through 1980. Ultimate
costs for remedial action are expected to exceed $100 million;
in addition, about $2 billion in lawsuits have been filed by
persons claiming damages. '1 32
OTA estimates that it costs ten to one hundred times
127. Marcus, New Ways at Hand for Toxic Disposal, N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1983
at C1, col. 4.
128. Fortuna, supra note 53, at 8. A fascinating aspect of the economics of haz-
ardous waste treatment is the discovery by many companies that the toxics they have
been discarding are valuable, sometimes far more so than continued manufacture of
toxic products anew. For example, Monsanto boasts an $8.2 million savings in 1982
"through waste recovery actions and the sale of previously discarded byproducts."
Marcus, supra note 127, at C3, col. 1. The 3M Company announced that its " 'Pollu-
tion Prevention Pays' program saved the company $26.5 million in 1982 and avoided
the generation of 25,000 tons of sludge and solid waste." Id.
129. Marcus, supra note 127, at C3, col. 1.
130. Id.
131. OTA, supra note 42, at 6.
132. Id.
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more to clean up a contaminated site and compensate victims
than to prevent pollution migration through waste contain-
ment. 1 33 "Throughout the country, wastes improperly dumped
decades ago are just now beginning to render drinking sup-
plies unusable."' 34
Perhaps the clincher on the diseconomics of non-compli-
ance, however, will prove to be the soaring costs of insuring
against hazardous waste liabilities and the increasingly fre-
quent unavailability of liability coverage at any price, both
due to a huge increase in awards arising out of environmental
litigation. 135 Thus, it is more economical for a generator,
transporter or disposer of hazardous waste to initially comply
with environmental regulations than to pay for a later clean
up or rely on insurance benefits that may accrue in the event
of a violation.
For the above reasons, the RCRA amendments dramati-
cally overhauled "the way America manages its hazardous
wastes." The emphasis has shifted from disposal to recovery
and reprocessing of these wastes. 3 '
By these amendments, Congress effectively has required
EPA to phase out most, if not all, methods of land dispo-
sal of hazardous wastes. To the extent that any method of
land disposal might still be allowed, Congress has shifted
the burden to EPA to take action before the statutory
prohibitions take effect and to industry to urge that EPA
act in time.'
It is likely that EPA will be unable to promulate regulations
for the land disposal of hazardous wastes by the statutory
deadline. In the absence of regulations, industry has the bur-
den of demonstrating to "a reasonable degree of certainty"'138
133. Id.
134. Hazardous Waste, supra note 49, at 69.
135. Diamond, Insurance Agairst Pollution is Cut, N.Y. Times, March 11, 1985
at Al, col. 6.
136. Id.
137. Rosbe & Gulley, supra note 89, at 10,463.
138. 42 U.S.C. § 6924(d)(1)(C), (e)(1).
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that "no migration of hazardous constituents"" 9 will result
from "the disposal unit or injection zone for as long as the
wastes remain hazardous.' 0 Upon the failure of industry to
meet this onerous burden and in the absence of EPA regula-
tions, land disposal (other than the exemptions for deep well
injections)"' of enumerated "specified wastes" is prohib-
ited." 2 Industry is thereby forced to consider other methods
of disposal such as recycling and recovery, incineration, and
physical-chemical treatment. 4" Hence the RCRA amend-
ments establish a national policy discouraging land disposal of
hazardous wastes and encouraging the use of new treatment
technologies.
According to the National Academy of Sciences, there ex-
ists "some technology or combination of technologies capable
of dealing with every hazardous waste so as to eliminate con-
cern for future hazards."' A staff scientist with the National
Research Council has concluded that, "[t]here is no one pan-
acea, but there are enough technologies out there to cover vir-
tually every instance.,1 5
D. Automatic Regulating Provisions
Perhaps the most important innovation of the 1984
RCRA amendments is the incorporation of self-executing reg-
ulations. In the event that EPA fails to meet any of the nu-
merous statutory deadlines imposed by the amendments, so
called "hammer provisions"'14 automatically become effective.
Thus, if EPA does not act within the time frame specified by
the statute, the statute itself specifies the regulations that be-
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See id. at § 6924(f).
142. Id. at § 6924(d)(1)(C), (e)(1).
143. Rosbe & Gulley, supra note 89, at 10,463.
144. Marcus, supra note 127, at C3, col.1.
145. Id.
146. They are called "hammer provisions" by EPA staff because of their in ter-
rorem effect. Rogers & Darrah, RCRA Amendments Indicate Hill Distrust of EPA,
Legal Times, Nov. 19, 1984, at 28.
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come effective as of the deadline date.1 47
The innovation of these hammer devices is the most
unique and intriguing part of the 1984 amendments. They en-
able Congress to circumvent one of the recent major obstacles
to effective regulation: the intervention of the Office of Man-
agement and Budget (OMB) to abort the issuance of regula-
tions or to water them down. Anti-regulatory EPA adminis-
trators can also use OMB as an excuse for regulatory
inadequacies. Unfortunately, however, there is no way Con-
gress can use the hammer system to prevent agencies from ap-
pointing incompetent people or administrators hostile to the
program. Nor can it be used to provide funds or motivate a
desire for adequate implementation and enforcement.
E. Enforcement Provisions
The RCRA amendments vastly expand the parties that
may be subject to a citizen suit in the event of an imminent
and substantial endangerment to health or the
environment. 1 48
Citizen suits are also available against any person "al-
leged to be in violation of any permit, standard, regulation,
condition, requirement, prohibition, or order'14 9 under RCRA,
and against EPA for failing to perform any non-discretionary
act or duty under RCRA.' 5 0 There are, however, certain citi-
zen suit limitations under this provision.' 5 '
Lastly, criminal and civil penalties have been expanded
147. In order to get this amendment passed in the Senate, Senator John Chafee,
a Republican from Rhode Island, took the very unusual and clever precaution of hav-
ing the EPA Director of the Office of Hazardous Waste sit in on the Senate and
conference committee markup sessions. The director, now EPA Administrator, Lee
Thomas, testified during the mark-up sessions, on the record, as to the reasonable-
ness of the established timetables for the generation of EPA regulation under the
RCRA amendments and as to EPA's capabilities. Interview with Steven J. Shimberg,
Counsel and Director, U.S. Senate Subcommitte on Envt'l. Pollution, in Washington,
D.C. (Feb. 15, 18, 1985).
148. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B).
149. Id. at § 6972(a)(1)(A).
150. Id. at 6972(a)(2).
151. Id. at § 6972(b)(1), (2).
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for knowing violators. 152
IV. The Political Atmosphere During Passage of the 1984
RCRA Amendments
Just three and a half years before the amendments were
signed, daily cutbacks were proposed in EPA staff, the
Office of Managment and Budget resisted the use of
Superfund monies for the clean-up of abandoned waste
sites, informal negotiations by EPA were taking place to
avoid litigation with industry concerning regulatory stan-
dards, and the restrictions on the disposal of toxic liquids
in landfills were eased. 5s
The above scenario was highlighted by the turmoil within
EPA's own administration. When Anne McGill Burford re-
signed from her post as EPA Administrator in March of 1983,
she was "under a deluge of charges of political and managerial
wrongdoing," and "six House subcommittees... [were] inves-
tigating allegations of political manipulation, conflict of inter-
est and industry bias among ... [EPA's] former top manage-
ment."' Between 1981 and the early part of 1983, the office
that was responsible for enforcing the nation's hazardous
waste laws was working harder for industry than for the pub-
lic safety.' 55
The first term of the Reagan administration did not
achieve acclaim for its achievements in environmental protec-
tion. Democratic critics attacked the administration for mov-
ing too slowly to clean up the country's 419 worst toxic dump
152. Id. at §§ 6928(d)(e), 6991(e).
153. Rogers & Darrah, RCRA Amendments Indicate Distrust of EPA, Legal
Times, Nov. 19, 1984 at 28.
154. Liners, Liquids and Conflict of Interest, Nat'l. J., Apr. 16, 1983, at 798.
155. Between March 1981 and June 1982, James W. Sanderson, a Denver attor-
ney representing Chemical Waste Management, Inc. (a subsidiary of a major landfill
company in the U.S.), was serving as Burford's personal consultant. Id. It was during
this period that EPA issued its final landfill regulations under the original RCRA
statute and also lifted the ban placed on "dumping containerized liquid wastes into
landfills." Id; see supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
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sites,1 6 and the League of Conservation Voters' 5 rated Rea-
gan "about a D-" on his environmental record. 58 To complete
the scenario, a reauthorization of RCRA failed in 1982 be-
cause "various controversies could not be settled" before Con-
gress adjourned.'59
The signs of necessary Congressional action had become
evident. Fortunately, "key congressional staffers" indicated
that a new momentum had evolved in 1983 to "renew and
tighten RCRA .. ."160 By November, 1983, the House had
passed its version of the bill and on July 25, 1984, the Senate
had unanimously passed its version' 6' (after the White House
had indicated it "might welcome a major toxic waste bill for
President Reagan to sign before the election").0 2 Compromise
language was worked out during the latter weeks of Septem-
ber' 63 and the bill passed unanimously in both the House and
the Senate on October 3rd and 5th, respectively.6 4
The bill, "aimed at closing loopholes in existing law, ' 65
and overturning "many of the blatantly pro-pollution deci-
sions made by Anne Burford during her tenure at EPA, ' 6 is
structured around the rigid "hammer provisions" that become
effective if EPA fails to act within the time prescribed by the
statute. These in terrorem devices167 reflected a distinct dis-
156. Mosher, EPA Still Doesn't Know the Dimensions of the Nation's Hazard-
ous Waste Problem, Nat'l. J., Apr. 16, 1983, at 796.
157. The League of Conservation Voters is "a political action group that rates
candidates and lawmakers on their environmental stands." Davis, The Environment
Issue: Cleaner Than Thou, Cong. Q., June 2, 1984, at 1338.
158. Id.
159. Davis, Clash Could Bring Major Changes in Law, Cong. Q., March 19, 1983,
at 583.
160. Id.
161. Davis, Senate Votes to Toughen Toxic Waste Law, Cong. Q., July 28, 1984,
at 1817.
162. Davis, Conferees Reach Agreement on Hazardous Waste Bill, Cong. Q.,
Sept. 29, 1984, at 2404.
163. See id.
164. Davis, RCRA Rewrite Strengthens Hazardous Waste Provisions, Cong. Q.,
Oct. 6, 1984, at 243; Granat, Congress Struggles to Quit But Does Not Finish, Cong.
Q., Oct. 6, 1984, at 2415.
165. Davis, supra note 162, at 2404.
166. Davis, supra note 161, at 1817-18.
167. See supra note 146, and accompanying text.
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trust by Congress of EPA's ability to effectively enforce the
many RCRA provisions in light of its prior enforcement
record."'
The remarkable nature of the passage of such strong reg-
ulations in the face of the administration's anti-regulatory fer-
vor is well expressed by one of the measure's most outspoken
opponents, Senator Steven Symms of Idaho, during the Sen-
ate's consideration of the conference report on the RCRA
amendments:
Can any Member of this body explain why it is necessary
to require EPA to list halogenated dibenzofurans as haz-
ardous wastes within the next 15 months? Or why the
lower line of a hazardous waste disposal facility should
have a permeability of 1 x 10(-7) centimeter per second?
Or why secondary waste-water treatment ponds employ-
ing biological treatment should be retrofitted if they have
a retention time in excess of 5 days? Or why steel under-
ground tanks can no longer be used in soils with a resis-
tivity of 12,000 Ohms? I submit that making these kinds
of judgements [sic] is the function of EPA, not the Con-
gress. These particular regulations may be workable, even
appropriate, but writing regulations is not our job.16 9
Despite the criticism, however, the bill unanimously passed
in the House and the Senate-clearly indicating Congressional
desire to take affirmative action in the area of toxic waste
regulation.
The amendments place an overwhelming burden on EPA
by requiring numerous rulemakings to be conducted and regu-
lations to be issued.1 7 0 It is likely that EPA will "default on a
168. See Rogers & Darrah, supra note 153, at 28.
169. 98 Cong. Rec. S13812 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1984) (statement of Sen. Symms).
170. For example, within 24 months of November 8, 1984, EPA must submit to
Congress a schedule for reviewing all hazardous wastes listed under § 6921 of RCRA
and publish guidelines within the established schedule period concerning the disposal
of such wastes. If EPA fails to make a determination as to the first third of the list by
August 1988, the second third of the list by June 1989, and the last third of the list
by May 1990, then the hammer provisions under this section take effect. See 42
U.S.C. § 6924 (1985).
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number of accounts,' 17 1 but the effect is that industry will not
be allowed to dispose of its hazardous wastes without regula-
tion in the event of an EPA failure. 172 For the safety of our
environment and the public health, we simply can't allow it.
VI. Conclusion
"The Reagan Administration thought a nation that had
voted for less government would tolerate less protection of the
environment."' 7 But the premise failed to recognize the enor-
mous public clamor for a safer environment which could not
exist if toxic waste were not strictly regulated.
The passage of the 1984 amendments to RCRA was an
"ironic conclusion" to the history of federal environmental
protection policies in this country.1 74 The innovative and ex-
tensive amendments represent the harshest environmental
laws passed in the last ten years and they were signed by
President Reagan.7 75 They were passed in reaction to the fears
created by the Love Canal-type tragedies 7 and the ominous
threat of a gradual destruction of our environment. Industry's
failure to regulate itself in the wake of these fears precipitated
Congressional consideration of harsher federal regulation, and
thus made the passage of the amendments a political
imperative.177
171. Rogers & Darrah, supra note 153, at 33.
172. The more likely result actually occurring, is that industry will urge EPA to
issue its regulations as soon as possible so as to prevent the application of the strict
hammer provisions.
173. Boraiko, Storing Up Trouble . . .Hazardous Waste, 167 Nat'l Geog. 350
(1985).
174. Rogers & Darrah, RCRA Amendments Indicate Distrust of EPA, Legal
Times, Nov. 19, 1984 at 28. It is interesting to note that President Reagan did not
sign the RCRA amendments into law until November 8, 1984, after election day.
175. Id.
176. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
177. Nevertheless, House staff members interviewed by the author expressed
doubts that the bill would have passed in the Senate and obtained White House ap-
proval had not Reagan made the incredible blunder of attempting to reappoint Ann
Burford (See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text) to an environmental posi-
tion. Mrs. Burford resigned again, this time on August 1, 1984, the day before she was
to be sworn into the position as Chair of the National Advisory Committee on Oceans
and Atmosphere, a job she foolishly characterized as a "nothing-burger" and "a joke."
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Despite many remaining deficiencies,7 8 the amendments
represent an awareness by Congress that only intensive uni-
form federal regulation can control a burgeoning nationwide
use of hazardous materials and creation of hazardous wastes.
The possibility and the extent of hazardous waste trage-
dies have already been demonstrated. The burden of mean-
ingful regulation and enforcement now rests on Congress and
EPA to insure that the benefits of modern-day industry are
not outweighed by the irreversible destruction of our people
and our environment.
Burford Resigns Under Fire-Again, Cong. Q., Aug. 4, 1984, at 1913.
178. While the 1984 RCRA amendments represent the toughest and most far-
reaching extension of hazardous waste regulations in existence today, there is still
much omitted and there remain duplications, inconsistencies, inadequacies, and gaps
in the regulatory and enforcement scheme. For example, lack of regulatory authority
over above ground storage tanks containing toxic materials still exists. Furthermore,
the budgetory strictures of the Gramm-Rudman Act threatened to deny to EPA the
funds it needs to do the incredibly complex and demanding job of effectively regulat-
ing toxic substances and wastes. The Gramm-Rudman Act (PL 99-177, Dec. 12,
1985), requires that the "federal deficit be eliminated using conventional legislative
means or, failing that, through unprecedented automatic spending cuts." Wehr, Con-
gress Enacts Far-Reaching Budget Measure, Cong. Q., Dec. 14, 1985, at 2604. The act
takes the historic step of binding the federal government into "five years of forced
deficit reductions with the goal of balancing the budget by October 1990." Id. On
February 7, 1985, a special three-judge federal panel held unconstitutional a critical
section of the Gramm-Rudman Act (providing for the "automatic, uniform spending
cuts if Congress and the president fail, through regular legislation, to reduce the fed-
eral budget deficit to levels specified" by the statute). Id. Wehr, Court Rejects
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Cuts ... But Case Appealed, Cong. Q., Feb. 8, 1986, at
216. The court held that the provision violated the constitutional separation of pow-
ers because it delegated executive powers to the comptroller general (who is remova-
ble by Congress) rather than to the president. Id. at 217. The comptroller general of
the General Accounting Office would make the "final determination of how large each
year's anticipated budget deficit will be and how much spending must be cut to bring
the deficit into line with targets set by the law. Speedy Ruling on Gramm-Rudman,
Cong. Q., Mar. 1, 1986, at 513. The Supreme Court, has recently reviewed the consti-
tutionality issue on appeal and has decided to affirm the court of appeals decision
that the key provisions are unconstitutional. Bowshner v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 1488
(1986).
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